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Abstract 
 
The process industry has widely adopted the Functional Safety Standards IEC61508 [1] and 
IEC61511 [2] for achieving the Functional Safety. These standards lay the framework for 
achieving functional safety by considering the entire life-cycle of the safety instrumented system 
(SIS).  Typical SIS safety life-cycle phases and functional safety assessment stages are illustrated 
in Figure-7 of IEC61511-1 [2].    
The design and engineering of the SIS are most often focused on achieving the required risk 
reduction for the safety instrumented functions (SIF). However, with this single minded focus, the 
design and engineering of the SIS frequently progresses without a well thought out safety plan.    
“By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail – Benjamin Franklin”.  
Taking cues from this quote, this paper, “Plan to Fail?” intends to draw attention to importance 
of having a well understood ‘Safety Plan’ in place. The standards provide guidance for the 
development of a safety plan. However it is imperative for the functional safety team to ensure 
that it is aligned with the particular project under consideration. This means establishing goals and 
concepts early in the project schedule.  The plan would then be updated as more details are known 
and hence be more effectively deployed during each phase of the safety life-cycle. 
Introduction 
The common perception about functional safety and functional safety standards is that it’s only 
related to defining the required SIL and whether it is achieved. This leads the functional safety 
engineers to mainly focus on the SIL assignment and SIL verifications tasks. This insular approach 
results in neglecting other important phases of the safety life-cycle as well as the activities done 
are ‘not to a plan’.   
The intent of this paper ‘Plan to Fail’ is to draw attention to the objectives, review the owners for 
the development and identify the key parameters which should be addressed in a functional safety 
plan. In an interview to US Chemical Safety Board, Dr. Trevor Kletz quoted: ‘How can we 
improve the design so this (accident) can’t happen, how we can remove the opportunity for errors’ 
[4]. One way to remove the opportunity of errors is to have a proper plan in place. A proper plan 
in place would then mean, ‘Plan to Succeed’ (i.e., succeed in the goal of achieving the objectives 
of functional safety). 
Objectives of Safety Plan 
As prescribed in IEC 61511 [2], the management of functional safety requires safety planning to 
be done for all phases of the safety life-cycle. The objective of developing a safety plan is to define 
the activities to be carried out by persons, departments, organizations who are associated with the 
design, implementation and maintenance of the functional safety. The planning shall be updated 
as necessary throughout the entire SIS safety life-cycle. The planning should be carried to the 
detailed activity level for every role. This includes individual or organization activities related to 
the particular phase of the SIS safety life-cycle. 
As per this definition, the objectives of the safety plan are: 
 To identify the activities to be carried out related to functional safety, 
 To identify the criteria the SIS design should meet, 
 To identify the techniques, measures and procedures for carrying out the identified 
activities,  
 To identify the persons, departments or organizations who would execute the identified 
activities and 
 To ensure that planning exists or is developed to ensure that the SIS meets the safety 
requirements. 
Timing to Develop the Safety Plan 
The next question is for which phase and at what time, the safety plan should be drafted. Figure 1 
below provides representation of the SIS safety life-cycle phases and functional safety assessment 
stages as defined in IEC 61511-1 [2]. This clearly indicates that the planning should happen for 
each phase. The plan for each phase should be in place and approved by all stakeholders before 
beginning the execution of the phase. This will help ensure that the activities proceed in a correct 
sequence and the expected outcome of each activity is defined. This will also help to ensure that 
the subsequent phases have the required inputs before starting the activities. 
 
Figure 1. SIS safety life-cycle phases and FSA stages 
Safety Life-Cycle Phase and Owners (Safety Plan Responsibility) 
Since the plan undergoes a change in each phase with respect to the activities, persons, departments 
and organization, the safety plan is considered to be a live document. Figure 2 shows the 
responsible organizations which carry out the work related to the life-cycle phase. Within each 
organization, the departments and within the departments, responsible persons need to be 
identified. Assigning responsibilities for the development of the safety plan and identifying critical 
interfaces should be determined early in the project life-cycle.   
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Figure 2. SIS safety life-cycle phases – Responsible Organizations 
IEC 61511 [2] specifies that the periodic update or review of the safety plan should take place. 
However, the responsibility of making the update or undertaking review is not specified.  
Due to the lack of clarity on the ownership, a project often progresses without a safety plan in 
place.   
Structure of the Safety Plan 
The IEC 61511 [2] does not specify any particular structure to be followed for the safety plan. The 
standard provides the flexibility of incorporating the safety plan as: 
− part of quality plan; or 
− a separate document titled ‘SIS Safety Life-cycle Plan’ or 
− several documents which may include company procedures and practices. 
Is this flexibility good? The main challenges with this flexibility with respect to above mentioned 
points are: 
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 If safety plan is part of quality plan, defining accountability of drafting the safety plan as 
part of the overall quality plan. Further, it poses challenge whether the appropriate 
stakeholder would be able to trace and use it. 
 If safety plan is part of quality plan OR a separate dedicated document, who owns and 
transfers the document to the appropriate stakeholder of the phase under execution or 
subsequent phases? 
 If safety plan is part of several documents and part of company procedures and practices, 
how to ensure that these documents are referred and applied for the phase under execution?   
A suggested solution to this challenge is to prepare an ‘Overall Safety Plan’ and also develop a 
safety plan per phase.  
The overall safety plan should be developed by the owner company and provide guidance on the 
minimum requirements as per the companies requirements and regulatory requirements of the 
place where the plant is being set up. The overall plan should also include the non-SIS based risk 
reduction applied in the design of the plant.  
The per phase safety plan should be prepared by the respective responsible party. They should 
detail the requirements for the particular phase only. Where the phase is owned by more than one 
party, each party should develop the safety plan for their scope of work. For example, the phases 
3 and 4 are executed normally by the EPC contractor and the system vendor. The EPC contractor 
should prepare the plan for the SRS and engineering inputs for SIS design which includes the 
design of sensors, final elements and functional requirements for logic solver. The system vendor 
should prepare the plan for the SRS covering the logic solver design which includes the design of 
its hardware and software.   
The owner company should be responsible to ensure that the individual phase plans are aligned to 
the overall safety plan.  
Contents of the Safety Plan 
The content of the overall and safety plans per phase can be set up as per the following sections. 
 To identify the activities to be carried out related to Functional Safety. 
Overall Safety Plan – Identify all phases which need to be carried out and requirements 
related to these phases which need to be considered in the safety plan. The plan should also 
include Non-SIS based risk reduction technologies design and criteria for considering those 
in the overall safety strategy. The overall safety plan should also set the target dates for 
each life-cycle phase by which activities of each phase should be completed.  
Safety Plan per phase – For each phase, define the objectives, inputs to the activities and 
the intended outputs of each phase. Further, it should also define whether a particular phase 
requires design review to be conducted and whether verification of the output needs to be 
done.   
 To identify the criteria the design should meet. 
Overall Safety Plan – Identify the documents which are required to be prepared which will 
specify design criteria for meeting functional and integrity requirements for the SIS.    
Safety Plan per phase – Identify the engineering activities for design of the SIF including 
its sub-systems based on the SRS. This includes the design of the sensors and initiators, 
logic solver and final elements. It also includes requirements for design reviews which 
should be conducted after completion of each important activity by system vendor such as 
hardware design, software prototypes and application software. Planning should also 
include requirements for SIL verification, hardware testing, software prototype testing and 
application software testing.     
 To identify the techniques, measures and procedures for carrying out the identified 
activities. 
Overall Safety Plan – Identify the techniques, measures and procedures to be applied for 
each phase to conform the design against specified requirements. For example:  
 Specifying one of the technique for hazard analysis to be applied (e.g., safety 
reviews, HAZOP, FMEA etc)  
 Specifying which SIL assignment method will be used, 
 Specifying the techniques for avoiding random hardware failures, such as use of 
redundancy.  
Safety Plan per phase – This includes the plan for implementing the techniques and 
measure which are identified in the overall safety plan. This should include the availability 
of tools and resources, the personnel who should be involved, and the detailed procedures 
which would be applied for carrying the work. 
 To identify the persons, departments or organizations who would execute the 
identified activities. 
Overall Safety Plan – Identify the requirements of personnel and the competence 
requirements to carry out each phase. This includes criteria for designers / engineers from 
the owner organization, EPC contractor, system vendor, third party consultants and 
assessing agencies.  
For example: 
 Participation from different disciplines (process, instrumentation, HSE, 
operations) for hazard analysis and SIL assignment. 
 Assigning a competent resource for carrying out SIL verification and design 
implementation. 
Safety Plan per phase – For each phase, implementation plan for each phase, roles (e.g. 
design review, testing, inspection etc) and responsibilities (e.g. HAZOP chairman / 
facilitator, scribe, application developer) of involved personnel, the requirements for their 
independence (e.g. the design review will be conducted by independent person within 
organization). 
Impact of not having a safety plan or not following the safety plan 
Each safety life-cycle phase is important with respect to functional safety. The SIS design builds 
upon the outcome of one phase as input for other. Hence the success of the project depends on 
execution of each phase based on a plan. Each facility and plant would be having different 
requirements based on its location, capacity, nature of process and the feed, owner requirements 
and risk tolerance criteria, regulatory requirements etc. Hence, the plan should be specifically 
developed for the plant and should not be a generic plan. 
Each of the safety life-cycle activities and the examples of impact for not having a safety plan or 
not following the safety plan are listed below. This is also shown in the Figure 3.  
 
  
Figure 3. Impact of not having Safety Plan 
 Hazard and Risk Assessment.  
− Incomplete / Incorrect assessment of hazards.  
− Safety critical elements not properly identified. This means the system design may 
have insufficient safeguards. 
− Next phase of SIL assignment cannot progress or progresses with insufficient data. 
− Risk to cost and schedule if the hazards surfaces in later stage of engineering. 
 Allocation of Safety Functions to Protection Layers 
− Unidentified SIFs. 
− Missed / Incorrect credit of IPLs. 
− May delay the procurement of the SIF components impacting the cost and schedule.  
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 Safety Requirements Specification for the SIS 
− Key functional requirement and technical parameters may not be available for the 
design and engineering phase. For example, if the process safety time is not 
captured, the valve closing time cannot be determined and the procurement of the 
valve is delayed.  
− Incomplete SRS may result into failures of the SIS. Based upon the study by the 
UK Health & Safety Executive on ‘Out of Control – Why Control Systems Go 
Wrong and How to Prevent Failures’ [3] the main contributor to the failures is 
incorrect specification. It contributes to 44% of failures. The components 
‘Inadequate Functional Requirement Specifications’ and ‘Inadequate Safety 
Integrity Requirement Specifications’ are 12% and 32% respectively. The result of 
the failures may be devastating for the plant safety. Further, if the failures reveal a 
systematic fault during operation phase, it may mean costly repair for modification 
of the SIS and probable stoppage to the operations. 
− Inputs for the logic solver design may not be complete resulting in delays of the 
design. For example, if the trip override philosophy is not defined, it would mean 
change in application software at a late stage in the project.  
− Important parameters for the SIL verification activity may not be adequately 
captured. This will result into the delays in completing the SIL verification. For e.g. 
definitions of β common cause failure factor, coverage criteria for proof tests. 
− Non-SIS related requirements may be missed. For example, the operator response 
to BPCS alarm is taken credit for in SIL assignment. However, if the requirements 
are not stated in SRS, it may be missed from the BPCS configuration. 
 Design and Engineering of the SIS 
− SIF design may not completely meet the requirements of SRS. 
− The SIL verification may not be completed and there might be hold points on 
important aspects such as voting, proof testing etc. For example, if the voting 
requirements change resulting in increase of the final elements, it not only changes 
the design of SIS, but also impacts other disciplines such as piping, civil.  
− The procedures for SIF commissioning, maintenance, operations and proof testing 
may have deficiencies resulting in challenges during those phases. For example, if 
the proof testing time for meeting the SIL of the SIF is based on the testing at certain 
frequency, delays in testing means operations with degraded SIL. 
 Installation, Commissioning and Validation 
− Incorrect sequence of installation may result in delayed commissioning. 
− Improper coordination of the agencies responsible for installation activities of SIF 
components such as field instruments, logic solver cabinets, field wiring and loop 
checks.  
− The non-compliances against design requirements are recorded as punch items 
during FAT or SAT. Some of these punch items may remain unaddressed due to 
the commissioning schedule pressures. Continuing commissioning with such open 
items means not having complete safeguarding in place. Further, the validation of 
the SIS after installation at site cannot be completed. 
 Operation and Maintenance 
− Before the ownership of the system is transferred from the project to owner 
operator, key document, such as SRS, should be revised and up-to-date. If this 
activity is not explicitly included in the overall safety plan, this step may not be 
completed. This may delay important operation and maintenance safety function 
activities from being completed. 
− If the maintenance activities like partial stroke tests or proof test activities are 
delayed or not performed, the integrity of the SIF may be degraded.  
− If the results of the findings are not compared against the criteria mentioned in SRS, 
defects/errors in the intended design cannot be ascertained.   
− Possible ignorance to the diagnostics messages generated by SIS means SIS repair 
is not done in time and may lead to increased spurious trips or no trips on demand.  
 Modification 
− The SIS modification proceeds without an updated functional safety plan and SRS. 
This means the scope of the modification is not defined. This might result not only 
into incorrect execution of the modification, but may also induce newer hazards in 
to the SIS / process.   
− Risk of not having updated documents will affect the operations and maintenance 
or any future upgrades or modifications. 
 Decommissioning 
− Improper decommissioning without complete analysis and effect may introduce 
new hazards or impact the safeguards for operational units and its SIS.  
− Risk of not having updated documents which affects the operations and 
maintenance of operational units and any future upgrades / modifications. 
Other activities which are conducted in the safety life-cycle which also has impact of not having a 
safety plan / not following the safety plan are reviewed below: 
 Verification – A plan for verification of outcome of each phase or important milestones 
within a phase should be prepared. This plan is necessary to ensure that verification 
activities are performed to demonstrate that the intended outcome of the activity or phase 
meets the objectives of the phase. This will also help to ensure that the subsequent phase 
has the sufficient required information. The verification plan should address the 
requirements for completing the task in terms of: 
− Required Checklists 
− Personnel who should carry the verification and independence required. 
− How the records of verification will be maintained and who will be responsible 
for carrying out actions on the findings.  
 Functional Safety Assessment – The overall functional safety plan should include the 
requirements for completing Functional Safety Assessment (FSA). The FSA is performed 
to investigate and arrive at a judgement based on evidence on functionally safety achieved 
by one or more SIS and protection layers. The requirements of FSA should include: 
− Scope of FSA  
− Skills, responsibilities and authorities of FSA team 
− Personnel who should carry the FSA and independence required. 
− Resources required and  
− Methods for revalidation post modifications.   
 Competence of personnel – Though part of management of functional safety, a plan 
should be in place for ensuring the requirements of competence. The requirements of 
competence apply to persons, departments and organizations associated with execution 
of one or more phases of the safety life-cycle.  
 
Conclusions 
The effects of failure due to incorrect planning and resultant improper execution may be 
devastating when it comes to matters of functional safety. The deficiencies in the design may 
remain hidden for years until an incident happens. The incidents may have serious effects on 
health, safety and environment as well as production and revenue. There should be a safety plan 
in place for meeting the functional safety objectives and to demonstrate the compliance to the 
requirements and standards. Having the approach of having an overall safety plan and safety plan 
per phase will mitigate the challenges with respect to ownership and the quality of the safety plan. 
Not having a safety plan or not executing as per the safety plan means ‘Plan to fail’. But to ensure 
safe operations and to do justice to the investment on functional safety, one of the key deciding 
factors is to execute all phases as per a properly developed safety plan. This approach would then 
mean a ‘Plan to succeed’; succeed in the goal of achieving the objectives of functional safety.  
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